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CASE NOTES
Shepard v. Superior Court - Recovery For Mental
Distress In A Products Liability Action
In Shepard v. Superior Court, I the California Court of Ap-
peals held that a party directly witnessing injury to a close rela-
tive2 could recover damages for resulting mental distress in a
strict products liability action. By recognizing a duty to avoid
infliction of emotional distress in a products liability case,4
Shepard elevated a manufacturer's duty in strict liability to the
level recently recognized in a negligence action.5 The court cor-
rectly reasoned that a cause of action for mental distress in prod-
ucts liability was consistent with economic realities of modem
1. 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977).
2. Shepard is limited to a situation in which the plaintiff has suffered actual physical
injury as a result of witnessing the infliction of injury upon a family member. Id. at 19,
142 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
In this comment "mental distress," "emotional harm," "mental trauma," and"emotional distress" are used interchangeably and may include a manifestation of physi-
cal harm within their meaning.
3. Id. at 21, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 615. The Shepard action grew out of a defective door
latch. For information concerning what constitutes a defective product and the standards
of proof applied, see Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972); W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE L.Aw oF Tors § 103 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PRossER]. See also Note, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 197 (1973).
4. Liability for infliction of emotional injury is not new in tort law; indeed, intention-
ally inflicted mental distress is a traditional basis for damages. See generally PossEa §
12. More recently, courts have granted recovery for negligent infliction of emotional harm.
See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); note 5 infra. Most
courts, however, have not adopted Shepard's extension of recognizing mental distress as
a compensable injury under products liability theory. See, e.g., Woodill v. Parke Davis,
58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 374 N.E.2d 683 (1978) (expressly denied any extension of mental
distress in products liability).
5. A negligent tortfeasor's liability extends to the mental distress of third party wit-
nesses. Courts' recent recognition of negligent infliction of emotional distress began with
the California case of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
Dillon allowed a mother to recover damages for injuries sustained in witnessing a car hit
her child. The court, however, restricted those situations where liability is imposed by
establishing guidelines to determine whether an injury was sufficiently forseeable to war-
rant redress. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. See also Rodrigues v. State,
52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970) (no physical injury necessary to recover for mental
distress). Subsequent decisions expanding recovery to this level include: D'Amicol v.
Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 326 A.2d 129 (Super. Ct. 1973); Toms v.
McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973); Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197
S.E.2d 214 (1973); Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976). But see Jelley
v. LaFlame, 108 N.H. 471, 238 A.2d 728 (1968); Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259
A.2d 12 (1969).
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society6 and the purposes behind products liability.7
The plaintiffs in Shepard were the parents and brother of a
child killed because of an allegedly defective door latch in the
family's Ford Pinto wagon." Based on strict liability and war-
ranty, the plaintiffs brought suit against Ford Motor Company
for emotional shock and resulting physical injuries caused by
observing the child's death. Accepting Ford's contention, how-
ever, that the California Supreme Court's holding in Dillon v.
Legg' prohibited plaintiffs from recovering for emotional injury in
other than a negligence action, the trial court sustained Ford's
demurrer without leave to amend."0 Plaintiffs sought a writ of
6. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 21, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
7. Strict products liability evolved from judicial dissatisfaction with negligence
theory where fault is the overriding ideal. Under negligence theory, courts subject manu-
facturers to liability only upon proof of actual negligence in production or design of a
product, see generally PRosSER § 96, or misrepresentation, see Shapo, A Representative
Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function, and Legal Liability for Product
Dissappointment, 60 VA. L. Rzv. 1109 (1974). In strict liability, however, fault is not an
element; an injured plaintiff need not prove negligence or fault on the part of a defendant.
This does not mean, however, that strict liability implies no fault. Rather, once the
plaintiff shows a defect in the product, the court will infer fault lies with someone in the
product's manufacture or chain of distribution.
The courts' purpose for imposing products liability is to place the risk of loss on the
party best able to bear it, to disperse the loss among society through the sale of goods,
see Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 passim (1965); see also
PROSSmR § 75; Charmichael, Strict Liability in Tort - An Explosion in Products Liability
Law, 20 DRAKE L. Rav. 528, 539 n.72 (1971); Frauen, Submission of a Strict Products Case
(A Defense Lawyers View), 20 FED. INs. COUNsEL Q. 22 (1970); Lascher, Strict Liability
in Tort For Defective Products: The Road to and Past Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L. Rv.
30, 47-48 (1965), and to reduce injury through enhanced safety. By imposing greater
liability on the seller, manufacturers will produce safer products to reduce the chances of
a lawsuit and avoid the costs and complexities of modem litigation. See Vetri, Products
Liability: The Developing Framework For Analysis, 54 ORE. L. R'v. 293, 299 n.35 (1975)
(a discussion of an empirical study concerning the persuasiveness of the enhanced safety
argument). Compare Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251, 466 P.2d 722, 725-26, 85
Cal. Rptr. 178, 181-82 (1970) ("[e]ssentially the paramount policy to be promoted by the
rule is the protection of otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects and the
spreading throughout society the cost of compensating them") with RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF ToRTS § 402A, Comment c (1965) [hereinafter referred to as RESTATEMENT § 402A]
("public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products in-
tended for consumption be placed on those who market them, and be treated as a cost of
production against which liability insurance can be obtained").
8. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 18, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 613. The Shepard family was traveling
home from vacation when another driver lost control of his automobile and struck the left
side of the Shepard car. Because of the defective latch, the rear door came open allowing
the children to fall out onto the highway. As the parents turned to look, they observed
the other automobile strike and kill one of the children. Id. at 18-19, 142 Cal. Rptr. at
613-14.
9. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). See note 5 supra.
10. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 18, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
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mandate compelling the trial court to vacate its order." Despite
Justice Kane's lengthy dissent, a California Court of Appeals"
granted the writ, reasoning that Dillon did not involve a products
liability issue and therefore was not dispositive of the plaintiffs'
complaint.'3 The majority in Shepard, however, did not find
Dillon totally inapposite. Rather, the court relied heavily on
Dillon's reasoning in allowing witnesses to recover damages in
strict liability for mentally induced physical injury.
Prior to Dillon, '1 courts allowed damages for emotional harm
in negligence only upon proof of actual or threatened physical
impact.'" Dillon abrogated the qualifications on the rule and
allowed recovery even though the witness was not physically
threatened by the tortfeasor's negligence. The Dillon court,
although noting the difficulty in fixing limits on this recovery,"'
indicated that this difficulty did not justify the denial of recovery
in all cases, and defined guidelines to govern the extent of future
liability. The Dillon guidelines are factors for courts to consider
on a case-by-case basis in ascertaining whether a defendant rea-
sonably should foresee injury to the plaintiff, and whether the
11. Id.
12. California Court of Appeal, First District, Division Two.
13. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 21, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
14. Dillon embodies the original notion of negligent infliction of emotional harm. See
note 5 supra.
15. Courts are reluctant to grant an interest in mental tranquility independent legal
protection. See, e.g., Taylor v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry., 72 Wash. 387, 130 P. 506 (1913).
See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF DAMAGES § 88 (1935); PROSSER §
12. Reasons for this reluctance include problems of proof and measurement of damages.
See id. § 12 n.28. Reluctant to impose liability for mental distress, courts resorted to legal
fictions such as an "impact rule" and "zone of danger" test to narrow and minimize
potential law suits. The impact rule limited recovery to situations where a direct physical
impact occurred. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & B. R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
The impact seems to afford a greater likelihood of genuine mental disturbance. Once this
determination is made, courts will allow damages for the mental suffering as well as
physical harm. See Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MicH. L. REv.
497, 504 (1922) (when "[tihe magic formula 'impact' is pronounced; the door opens to
the full joy of a complete recovery"). Courts, however, have stretched this rule to allow
recovery for very minor impacts. Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144
S.E. 680 (1928) (defendant's horse evacuated his bowels into the plaintiff's lap); Porter v.
Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (dust in eyes satisfied the test);
Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 185 N.W.2d 345, 347 (1957) (recognizing that courts "go
very far in finding sufficient impact from the most trivial contact"). Because of the impact
rule's harshness, many jurisdictions abandoned it in favor of the more liberal zone of
danger rule. See PRossE § 54. The zone of danger rule imposes a duty of care to persons
directly threatened by a defendant's negligence, but does not require any physical impact
to allow recovery for mental distress. A few jurisdictions still recognize the zone of danger
standard. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974).
16. 68 Cal. 2d at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
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defendant owes plaintiff a duty of due care. 7 Accordingly, the
Dillon guidelines intertwine foreseeability and duty by requiring:
(1) close proximity of the plaintiff to the accident; (2) emotional
impact of direct observation; and (3) a close relationship between
the plaintiff and victim. 8 Dillon also imposed a requirement of
physical harm as a prerequisite to the action: a plaintiff could
maintain an action only when the emotional shock resulted in
physical injury." These guidelines and the physical harm require-
ment thus limit the defendant's "otherwise potentially infinite
liability.' '20
One significant issue in Shepard was whether Dillon, includ-
ing its guidelines and restrictions, should apply in a products
liability action where fault is not an element of proof."' Funda-
mental to this issue is whether the policy reasons underlying
strict products liability should apply equally for physical harm
caused by mental distress and for physical harm caused by direct
force. To answer this question the Shepard court ascertained the
existing limitations on the type of injury compensable in products
liability as defined in Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section
17. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
18. Id. at 738, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. "[N]o immutable rule can
establish the extent of that obligation for every circumstance of the future. We can,
however, define guidelines which will aid in the resolution of such an issue as the instant
one." Id. Dillon indicated that courts will evaluate these factors in deciding whether the
accident and injury are reasonably foreseeable. This reasonableness standard, however,
is not limited to Dillon's guidelines alone. Rather, the Dillon court maintained that in
future cases courts will establish limits based upon facts less clear than the prima facie
facts in Dillon. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
19. Id. at 738, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
20. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79. Shepard adopts these restrictions
for the same reason. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 19, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
21. Previously, products liability theory did not include recovery for the mental dis-
tress of third parties. The Shepard dissent advanced one reason for denying such an
extension based upon RESTATEMENT § 402A, see note 22 infra. See also Woodill v. Parke
Davis, 58 111. App. 3d 349, 374 N.E.2d 683 (1978). The language of § 402A limits its impact
to sellers' liability for "physical harm" to users or consumers. The drafters entitled this
section: "Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer."
Neither this section, nor the drafters' comments, explain what constitutes physical harm.
The Shepard dissent argues that the limitation of "physical harm" excludes mentally
induced physical injury. 76 Cal. App. at 21, 22, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 616. This argument,
however, fails for two reasons. First, although the reasoning may be valid in a case of
mental distress to the user himself, courts should not apply the reasoning to third persons
because a caveat to § 402A explicitly states that "the Institute expresses no opinion as to
whether the rule stated . . . may not apply . . . to harm to persons other than users or
consumers." RESTATEMENT § 402A, Caveats. Second, § 402A incorporated the requirement
of physical harm to exclude economic or pecuniary harm, rather than mental injury. See
generally Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 447, 148 N.Y.S.2d
284 (Sup. Ct. 1955); PROSSER § 101.
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402A.22 A strict reading of the Restatement, however, does not
conclusively establish the limits of compensable injury. Thus, to
clarify the scope of the Restatement's language,23 the majority
reviewed past California products liability cases24 and determined
that precedent allowed extensions beyond the Restatement's lit-
22. RESTATEMENT § 402A: Special Liability of Seller of Products for Physical Harm
to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the products from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
23. The California Supreme Court previously held that a plaintiff in products liabil-
ity could seek recovery under both strict liability and negligence theories for physical
injuries. Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 482 P.2d 681, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769
(1971). The Shepard majority saw "no logical reason why the same rule of multiple
theories of recovery should not be extended to those who suffer physical injuries indirectly
as a result of emotional shock, as contended in this case." 76 Cal. App. 3d at 20-21, 142
Cal. Rptr. at 615.
24. The California Supreme Court first imposed tort liability on manufacturers of
defective products in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). There, the court noted that to establish a manufacturer's
liability a plaintiff need only prove correct product usage and a product defect causing
injury. Greenman reasoned that manufacturers, rather than unwary customers, should
bear the costs of defect related injuries. Id. at 74, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
The court expanded Greenman to impose liability on retail dealers in Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964). Vandermark was the
first judicial extension beyond Greenman and indicates courts' early willingness to expand
products liability. Vandermark indicated that strict liability on the manufacturer and
retailer affords maximum protection to the plaintiff and works no injustice because manu-
facturers and dealers can adjust the costs of injury among themselves (presumably
through obtaining insurance). 61 Cal. 2d at 662-63, 391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
California cases have expanded products liability by imposing strict liability upon
wholesale and retail distributors, Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 65 Cal. App. 2d 228,
71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968), home builders, Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App.
2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969), bailors and lessors of personal property, McClaflin v.
Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969), and licensors
of chattels, Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970). Strict liability
applies to defects in design as well as manufacture. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.
3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970). Furthermore, strict products liability
extends recovery to bystanders injured when a defective product causes an accident.
Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969);
Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 331, 79 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1969).
These cases indicate a trend in California to broaden the scope of liability to cover all
reasonably foreseeable plaintiffs when recovery is consistent with the purposes of loss-
distribution, injury reduction, and enhanced safety. See note 7 supra.
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eral language when shown to be consistent with the policies and
purposes underlying strict products liability.25
The majority implied that extending recovery for mentally
induced physical injury accorded with the policies and purposes
for imposing strict products liability-policies and purposes ar-
ticulated as early as 1944 by California's Justice Traynor."5 Jus-
tice Traynor recognized that persons suffering injury from defec-
tive products may not be prepared to meet the costs of injury and
the resulting loss of time and health.2 He viewed these burdens
as needless misfortunes because manufacturers could insure
against the risk of injury and distribute the loss among the public
as a cost of doing business.28 Justice Traynor realized that in
balancing the responsibility of injury and the policy of preventing
injurious accidents, "the manufacturer is best situated to afford
such protection."' 9
Accordingly, the Shepard majority equated the defendant's
duty to avoid infliction of mental distress to the plaintiff in strict
products liability to the defendant's duty to the plaintiff that
Dillon applied in negligence.3 The majority indicated the plain-
tiffs' allegations, if true, established plaintiffs' right to recover
under a negligence theory. 31 Because the duty owed to a plaintiff
in strict liability is the same as the duty owed in negligence, these
25. "[The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the
market rather than the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d at 74, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
See also notes 26-29 infra and accompanying text. The Shepard majority stated "[olur
conclusion is in consonance with the stated purpose of the courts in adopting the doctrine
of strict liability." 76 Cal. App. 3d at 21, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
26. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 458, 150 P.2d 436, 440
(1944) (concurring opinion). Even in the absence of negligence, "public policy demands
that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and
health inherent in defective products that reach the market." Id.
27. Id. at 459, 150 P.2d at 441.
28. Id. Justice Traynor maintained that discouraging defective products serves the
public interest; but if these products nevertheless reach the market, the public interest is
in shifting the responsibility for whatever injury they may casue to the manufacturer
responsible for them reaching the market. Such a general and constant risk requires public
protection. Id.
29. Id.
30. Shepard uses the limiting factors from Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d
912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), in determining whether the defendant owes a duty to avoid
infliction of mental distress. According to the majority, by alleging the presence of these
factors in the complaint, a sufficient cause of action is stated. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 21, 142
Cal. Rptr. at 615.
31. Id. at 20, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
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allegations also should establish a prima facie case in products
liability. 2
The majority also. indicated that although Dillon did not
preclude extending products liability for mental distress, the
Dillon restrictions were applicable.3 In so holding, the majority
rejected the dissent's contention that Dillon limits recovery to
negligence cases where fault is the foundation for the duty im-
posed.34 The majority held that the injuries complained of in
Shepard were equally foreseeable consequences of defective de-
sign or manufacture, or of negligent driving,31 and that the manu-
facturer of the defective product should be liable for those conse-
quences. Accordingly, to permit recovery against the manufac-
turer responsible for the injury is consistent with both Dillon and
Justice Traynor's policy reasons for imposing strict products lia-
bility.36
Although the Shepard majority implied that foreseeability is
a question for the trier of fact, Justice Kane in his dissent argued
that foreseeability is a question of law.37 Arguing against acknowl-
edging the plaintiffs' cause of action, Justice Kane viewed the
crucial policy question as whether the manufacturer's limited
duty should include liability for mental, as opposed to physical
trauma.3 Justice Kane proposed several factors useful in evaluat-
ing a manufacturer's liability and duty of care to third persons.
Those factors are:
[T]he extent to which the transaction was intended to affect
the plaintiff; the foreseeability of harm to him; the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suf-
fered; the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct; the
32. For the action to lie in strict liability, however, the court had to conclude that
Dillon would not exclude liability for mental distress if the action were brought in products
liability. Although the majority indicated that Dillon did not limit the extension of prod-
ucts liability to include mental distress, they did indicate that the limits Dillon imposed
on recovery applied equally to negligence, strict liability, and warranty cases. Id. at 21,
142 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
33. Id. at 20, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 21, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
36. "To permit recovery against the negligent driver and except the manufacturer
responsible for the defective condition contributing to the injuries," stated the majority,
"would deny common sense and be inconsistent with the realities of modem society." Id.
37. Justice Kane concluded that ascertaining the duty to avoid injury to the plaintiff
is a question of law. Id. at 23, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 616. He then reasoned that the same policy
factors are applicable to foreseeability and duty. Consequently, foreseeability was also
determined as a matter of law. Id. at 23-30, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 616-21.
38. Id. at 23, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
1979]
392 University of Puget Sound Law Review
extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to
the community of imposing a duty with resulting liability for
breach; and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance
for the risk involved . . .39
Justice Kane analyzed these factors as individual policy ar-
guments to defeat arguments in favor of finding a manufacturer's
duty to prevent infliction of mental distress, and thus to deny
recovery, in strict liability, for injuries caused by mental trauma.
Justice Kane first attempted to show that, from a policy stand-
point, no intent to protect witnesses existed within the transac-
tion.40 Courts, however, long have eliminated privity as a criterion
for imposing strict liability; the policy reasons behind eliminating
privity requirements4' should not be discounted merely because
the plaintiffs were physically injured by witnessing an accident
rather than by direct force. Further, the factors concerning cer-
tainty of injury and causation, contrary to Justice Kane's conten-
tion, are questions of fact for a jury. Because Dillon's guidelines
adequately provide a vehicle for jury determination of causation
and certainty of injury, a court's only difficulties in allowing the
fact-finder to decide these factors are administrative.2 Justice
Kane presented no compelling policy argument against the Dillon
view that "administrative difficulties do not justify the denial of
relief for serious invasions of mental and emotional tranquility
''43
The dissent also incorrectly interjected fault into its choice
of applicable factors. Inquiry into moral blame proves inappro-
priate and ineffective in a products liability case because judicial
policy favors spreading the losses of injury regardless of blame-
worthiness, fault, or intent." Because Justice Kane believed this
should not be a products liability case, he would have applied this
fault related argument to deny the cause of action. His moral
blame argument suggestedthat physical injuries caused by emo-
tional trauma are more speculative and conjectural than those
caused by direct impact.4 5 Justice Kane felt that because of the
speculative nature of the injury, fault should govern the issue of
39. Id. at 23, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 616-17.
40. Id. at 24, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
41. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
42. Further, experiments have proven that emotional shock can cause physical in-
jury. See note 50 infra.
43. See 68 Cal. 2d at 743, 441 P.2d at 922, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 82 (quoting State Rubbish
Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (1952)).
44. See note 7 supra.
45. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 25-26, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
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a manufacturer's liability. He felt the inherent dangers of impos-
ing strict liability should be mitigated when the claim of injury
had a greater probability of abuse, and fault is the proper basis
for balancing speculative injury against a genuine need for recov-
ery. 46
To justify applying fault, Justice Kane relied upon a passage
from Dillon which stated that "[tihe basis for such claims must
be the adjudicated liability and fault of defendant; that liability
and fault must be the foundation for the tort-feasor's duty of due
care to third parties who, as a consequence of such negligence,
sustain emotional trauma."47 Justice Kane maintained that
Dillon, through the quoted passage, explicitly required fault as an
indispensable element of duty to the plaintiff in a mental distress
action. The Dillon passage, however, refers only to the limitation
that a third person suffering emotional harm after witnessing an
accident could not recover unless the tortfeasor, rather than the
victim, was the primary cause of the accident."1 This meant only
that the victim's contributory negligence defeats the witness'
claim. Accordingly, the mother in Dillon who witnessed the tort-
feasor's car strike her child could recover because the driver was
at fault rather than the child.49
Furthermore, although fault may have been the foundation
for the Dillon holding, fault is the foundation in almost every
negligence action. Fault is a factor useful at trial in negligence to
weigh the rights and liabilities of the parties, but for an appellate
court, determining whether a class of injury can be redressed as
a matter of law, fault is an inappropriate criterion. The issue is
whether physical injuries caused indirectly through emotional
harm are as equally compensable as physical injuries caused
through direct forces. Merely because the Dillon court recognized
mental distress in negligence should not preclude its recognition
in other types of actions. Fault has no basis in strict liability
where the emphasis is upon loss-distribution, risk-spreading, and
46. Id. at 26, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
47. Id. (citing Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 733, 441 P.2d 912, 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72,
76 (1968)).
48. As the court in Dillon stated, immediately preceding the statement quoted by the
dissent, "[in the absence of primary liability of the tortfeasor for the death of the child,
we see no ground for an independent and secondary liability for claims for injuries by third
parties." 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76. The court made this
statement to qualify a question concerning contributory negligence. If contributory negli-
gence exists it relieves liability of the defendant to third persons. Id. The dissent read the
statement out of context.
49. Id.
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injury-reduction through enhanced safety, rather than blamewor-
thy conduct. 50 An injury compensable in negligence should not be
denied in products liability simply because the basis of liability
is different.
Justice Kane's most critical factor in determining liability
involves foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff." Although, ac-
cording to Justice Kane, foreseeability embraces both policy and
social considerations, he offers no explanation as to why this is
true.51 Justice Kane contends that the criteria used in determin-
ing foreseeability are similar to those used in determining the
duty to the plaintiff. Those criteria, however, are inapplicable in
determining foreseeability in a products liability suit for the same
reasons that factors of privity, causation, certainty of injury, and
moral blame are inappropriate in the duty determination. 53 Nev-
ertheless, Justice Kane uses those criteria to conclude that fore-
seeability of the occurrences in Shepard are too speculative and
that this class of injury is not foreseeable as a matter of law.54 It
is not speculative, however, to foresee children thrown from a car
because of a defective rear door latch. Similarly, it is reasonable
50. Even the dissent in Shepard recognized these factors as the avowed purposes
behind strict products liability. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 26-27, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 619. See note
7 supra.
The question involved herein is whether this class of injury is compensable in a strict
liability action. Fault has no bearing on this inquiry. See notes 7 & 20 supra, and text
accompanying notes 26-29 supra. The reasoning of the Shepard majority is consistent with
Justice Traynor's purposes for imposing products liability. The decision illustrates courts'
growing awareness of the potential injury from emotional shock. Experiments have proven
the interrelationship between the physical organism and strong emotions, and medical
science has demonstrated that mental distress, such as fright, will accompany and precede
definite and readily observable physical reactions. See Smith, Relation of Emotions to
Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193 (1944). See
also Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REv. 497, 499 (1922)
where the author states "[i]t is clearly demonstrated that it is impossible to have fear
as a purely emotional thing. 'We fear not in our hearts alone, not in our brains alone, not
in our viscera alone-fear influences every organ and tissue.'" Smith, supra, at 217-20,
contains an extensive listing of clinical disorders produced or aggravated by psychic
stimuli. Direct physical results of fear can include diabetes, heart attack, and even tooth
decay. Goodrich, supra, at 503.
Mental distress, therefore, is neither too metaphysical nor so inconsequential as to
preclude liability for its physical manifestations. Cases recognizing physical injury tracea-
ble to mental distress include: Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709
(1965); Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892); Batalla v. State,
10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961); Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 A. 202
(1907); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 54 S.W. 944 (1900); H. E. Butt Grocery
Co. v. Perez, 408 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
51. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 24, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
52. Id.
53. See notes 40-50 supra and accompanying text.
54. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 24, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
Mental Distress
to assume the children's parents would be driving the defective
automobile and would witness the tragedy."5 The reasonableness
standard to determine foreseeability of injury should be a key
factor in a factual determination of liability. Justice Kane, in
using policy factors to hold as a matter of law that emotional
injuries in products liability are so speculative or bizarre 56 as to
completely deny liability, ignores both use of the reasonableness
standard and Dillon's requirement of determining foreseeability
on a case-by-case basis. 7
Justice Kane's final argument concerned protection of Amer-
ican economic activity." Examining the effect pf strict liability
for mental distress on manufacturers, Justice Kane argued for
weighing economic realities against the reasons for recovery.
Fearing the possibility of infinite liability to the manufacturer, he
urged a balancing of the need for an adequate recovery and the
survival of viable enterprises.59 Although the dissent correctly
concluded that industry survival is necessary, it should not be a
reason to deny liability in all instances. Reduction of injury and
death should predominate in a balancing analysis. Moreover, the
possibility of infinite liability should not arise because the Dillon
restrictions delineate the scope of liability and because courts can
utilize the reasonableness standard to define limits on duty and
foreseeability.60 Accordingly, because existing theories of law pro-
perly limit recovery, the dissent's balancing approach should not
weigh in favor of completely denying liability, but rather in favor
of a case-by-case determination of the merits of the claim in light
of Dillon and the reasonableness standard." Only through an
55. The majority had no trouble finding this event foreseeable. Id. at 21, 142 Cal.
Rptr. at 615. Indeed, many similar hypothetical situations can be foreseen; for example,
a mother witnessing the death of a child because of a defective tricycle rolling into the
path of a car; the family witnessing the electrocution of the father using a defective power
tool.
56. The dissent in Shepard stated "it is hardly questionable that the foreseeability
of the precise occurrence here is nothing more than mere speculation" and that from a
practical viewpoint "it can hardly be said that the manufacturer in actuality envisioned
or foresaw this bizarre sequence of events . 76 Cal. App. 3d at 24, 142 Cal. Rptr. at
617.
57. "[R]easonable foreseeability does not turn on whether the particular defendant
as an individual would have actually foreseen the exact accident and loss; it contemplates
that courts, on a case-to-case basis, analyzing all circumstances, will decide what the
ordinary man under such circumstances should reasonably have foreseen." Dillon v. Legg,
68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
58. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 28-29, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
59. Id. at 29, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 620; accord, Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385
F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967). See also Note, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 745 (1976).
60. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 21, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
61. See note 56 supra. Speculation on the effects of liability to manufacturers should
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analysis of the facts in an individual case can a determination of
foreseeability and the goals of fairness, judicial temperance, and
evenhandedness truly prevail. 2
Contrary to the dissent's prediction, Shepard's extension of
products liability to include liability for mental distress will nei-
ther lead to a flood of litigation 3 nor to the possibility of infinite
liability. Courts recognize mental distress in a negligence suit and
avoid ficticious claims through both the Dillon restrictions and
standards of reasonable foreseeability. Reasonableness standards
to gauge objective physical symptoms manifesting mental dis-
tress in negligence 4 equally are applicable in a products liability
case. Accordingly, courts should allow an action for mental dis-
tress in products liability to be heard by a jury and not be denied
as a matter of law because of unfounded fears.
Justice Traynor's policy reasons for imposing strict products
liability apply equally to indirect and direct physical injuries.
Justice Traynor would place the responsibility on the manufac-
turer for whatever injury his defective product may cause.,5 The
Shepard majority impliedly acknowledges Justice Traynor's
analysis in allowing plaintiff witnesses to maintain their action
for mentally induced physical injuries in products liability. The
Shepard decision, consequently, furthers the argument that the
objective of our court system should not be to reject and limit
potential litigation, but to evolve a system to remedy wrongs in
a reasonable and just way. 6 By recognizing emotional and physi-
not affect the limits on this liability because reasonableness standards will sufficiently
limit recovery.
62. The guiding principles of "judicial temperance," "even-handedness," and
"fairness to all" are proclaimed by the dissent. The dissent indicated that plaintiffs' still
have a claim in negligence for mental distress even if recovery in products liability is
denied. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 29 n.3, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 620 n.3. Negligence, however, requires
proof of fault; courts recognize fault is difficult to prove in products liability. See note 5
supra.
63. In jurisdictions that have allowed recovery for mental distress, statistics have
failed to show any "flood of litigation." See Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 460,
210 A.2d 709, 714 (1965) (citing Smith, supra note 50, at 302); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100,
112 & n.7 (1959).
64. Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976), applied a reasonableness
standard to gauge objective physical symptoms of mental distress in negligence.
65. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
66. In Washington, courts have not faced the precise question addressed in Shepard.
Washington courts, however, have recognized negligent infliction of emotional harm in
Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976), and products liability in Ulmer
v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969). Hunsley, unlike the California
court in Dillon, did not delineate the scope of negligent infliction of mental distress.
Rather, the Washington court established the existence of a duty to avoid negligent
infliction of emotional harm. Hunsley held that to recover a plaintiff must prove this duty
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cal harm through mental distress to be as painful and destructive
as physical damage caused by direct force, Shepard brings this
objective closer to reality.
G. Scott Greenburg
was breached by demonstrating that the injury was reasonably foreseeable as a result of
the defendant's conduct, and that the mental distress would be the reaction of a reasona-
ble man. 87 Wash. 2d at 435-36, 553 P.2d at 1103. Further, the court declined to draw an
absolute boundary around the class of persons whose peril may stimulate the mental
distress as did Dillon by the requirement of proximity. Liability, instead, is left for jury
determination within reasonableness standards.
The time is right for Washington courts to follow Californie's lead and make the
extension recognizing mental distress in products liability. The reasonableness standard
applied in Hunsley is applicable in both negligence and products liability as emphasized
by this comment's analysis of Shepard.
